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Abstract. This paper clarifies the terms „institutions‟ and „social structures‟ and related 
terms „rules‟, „conventions‟, „norms‟, „values‟ and „customs‟. Part one explores the 
similarities between institutions and social structures whilst the second and third parts 
explore differences. Part two considers institutions, rules, habits or habitus and 
habituation, whilst part three critically reflects on three common conceptions of social 
structures. The conclusion comments upon reflexive deliberation via the internal 
conversation.  
 
 
Introduction 
Whilst the terms „institutions‟ and „social structures‟2 feature extensively in many social scientific 
disciplines, there is more than a little ambiguity about what each term means and how they relate to one 
another.3 Although a degree of clarity is sometimes gained from the context, this is not always so. In 
any case, the alternative is not to simply abandon attempts at clarification and definition, but to proceed 
with working definitions that others might build upon. Let us consider some of the ambiguities I have in 
mind. 
 
Perhaps the most common way of (mis)treating the relationship between institutions and social 
structures is to use them interchangeably. This may be done without thinking, or it may be rooted in the 
common idea that institutions are kinds of social structures. For Hodgson (2006a: 2, passim): 
„Institutions are the kind of structures that matter most in the social realm: they make up the stuff of 
social life‟. For Wells 1970: 3) „Social institutions form an element in a more general concept known as 
social structure‟. Risman (2004: 431) simply „prefers‟ to define gender as a social structure rather than 
defining „gender as an institution‟, but she sees the difference as largely linguistic.  
 
Another common approach to institutions and social structures, noted by Jessop and Nielsen (2003: 1), 
is to (mis)treat them as patterned social practices, in particular regularities in the flux of events. This 
confuses the conditions that make action possible with the action itself. This is remarkable given that 
Giddens‟s (1979, 1984) Structuration theory, Bhaskar‟s (1989) Transformational Model of Social Action 
(TMSA) and Archer‟s (1995, 1998) Morphogentic approach, all of which reject the idea that institutions 
and social structures are patterns, have been available for decades.  
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The term „institution‟ is often used to refer to things like: gender, money, the family, religion, property, 
markets, the state, education, sport and medicine, language, law, systems of weights and measures 
and table manners. This ignores important differences in the nature of these things. The institution of 
money, for example, does not contain human beings, whereas the institution of the family clearly does. 
Are money and families different kinds of institution, or is one of them not really an institution at all? For 
Schmid (1994: 3-5) „early retirement, further education, retraining and regulation of working hours, trade 
unions, labour and social security laws, labour market programs, codetermination and collective 
bargaining‟ are all institutions. The problem here is that the term „institution‟ becomes a „catch all‟ term 
to refer to all kinds of social phenomena. Portes (2005) refers to this as the „institutions are everything 
approach‟.  
 
The term „social structure‟ is also used in many ways and, as Porpora (2007: 195) notes: „there 
continues to be a certain blurriness in the way we speak of social structure‟. The term can be used 
negatively, to refer to phenomena like „rules, relations, positions, processes, systems, values, meanings 
and the like that do not reduce to human behaviour‟ (Lawson 2003: 181, emphasis added). But because 
there are many things that do not reduce to human behaviour, this meaning is impractically broad. 
Moreover, even if social structures and institutions are irreducible to human behaviour, this tells us 
nothing of the differences between them. In a similar vein, and by emphasising the first word of the pair, 
„social structure‟ can be used to refer to anything that is the result of human action, as opposed to some 
naturally occurring phenomenon, once again making the meaning impractically broad. The term „social 
structure‟ can be used in an „architectural‟ sense where we refer to the structure of a bridge, market, 
industry or organisation; or to the way a bridge, market, industry or organisation is structured. It can be 
used to refer to specific phenomenon like the structure of social class or gender; or to general 
phenomena, where it acts as a place-holder for a series of un-named „structural‟ phenomena. It can also 
be used to refer to society as a whole, or perhaps in a general sense to mean anything that is external 
to an organisation or an individual which, once again, makes the meaning impractically broad. 
Incidentally, my argument is not that all of these ways of using the term are exactly wrong; it is that 
there is simply far too much ambiguity.  
 
Finally, discussion of social structures and institutions, often involves the use of terms like habits, 
habitus, rules, conventions, norms, values, roles, customs, laws, regulations, practices, routines, 
procedures and precedents, not to mention less commonly used terms like mores, scripts, obligations, 
rituals, codes and agreements.  Once again, there is often confusion about what each of these terms 
mean, how they relate to one another, and how they relate to social structures and institutions. Consider 
two examples. In considering „habits, routines, social conventions, social norms‟ as types of rules, 
(1999: 92) conflates properties that should be associated with human agency, (i.e. habits) with 
properties that should be associated with institutions (i.e. conventions and norms). He also makes the 
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common mistake of confusing the conditions that make action possible (i.e. conventions and norms) 
with subsequent actions (i.e. routines). Bourdieu, and followers, sometimes suggest that habitus (a 
property of human agency) is some kind of structure. Bourdieu‟s definition of habitus as „structured 
structures predisposed to function as structuring structures‟ (1998: 72, passim) appears regularly. To be 
fair, Bourdieu, and followers, sometimes suggest that habitus is a disposition, a property of human 
agency, and sometimes the term „structure‟ is used not as a social, but as a „cognitive structure‟ 
(Lizardo 2004: 381). Once again the charge is one of ambiguity.  
 
Given this ambiguity, remedial work needs to be done to bring some clarity to the terms „institution‟ and 
„social structure‟. And this is the objective of the paper. Clarifying the meaning of institutions and social 
structures, however, requires some work on related terms, so I will also deal with rules (and related 
terms), habit or habitus and habituation.  
 
The first part of the paper uses these insights to explore the similarities between social structures and 
institutions on the one hand, and human beings, actors or agents on the other. The second and third 
parts use these insights to explore differences. The second part considers institutions to be sets of 
rules, conventions, norms, values and customs, but then goes on to consider the relation between 
institutions and habits or habitus and the process of habituation – and touches upon some new 
developments in neuroscience The third part draws largely on an important historico-theoretical 
overview of over a century of writing on social structures by Lopez and Scott, (but departing from them 
in significant ways) to re-consider social structures.  
 
1. The similarities between social structures and institutions vis-à-vis agents 
I open this section (based upon Hodgson 2004: 179-181) by stating the social ontology that forms the 
basis of my analysis, because this: allows the reader to identify fundamental points of agreement or 
disagreement, without having to guess my position; obviates the need to repeat arguments that, if not 
widely known, are readily available; and highlights those issues and arguments that, whilst important, 
are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
a) Ontic differentiation between agents, and social structures and institutions. Agents on the one 
hand, and social structures and institutions on the other, are fundamentally different kinds of 
things. Social structures and institutions are non-agential phenomena; and agents are non-
structural, non-institutional, phenomena.  
 
b) Ontic differentiation between agential properties and social structures and institutions. Habits 
are embodied or internalised dispositions, capacities or powers and, as such, are properties of 
agents. The causal influences that generate habits might well lie (directly or indirectly) in 
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phenomena like social structures and institutions that are external to agents, but once they are 
embodied or internalised, they become the emergent properties of agents.4 
 
c) The dependence of social structures and institutions on agents. Social structures and 
institutions exist only via the intentional and unintentional actions of human agents.  
 
d) The dependence of agents on social structures and institutions. For their socialization, survival 
and interaction, human agents depend upon social structures and institutions, that influence 
their behaviour. Taking the previous three points together, we might say that agency, and 
social structures and institutions, whilst independent in the sense of different, are nevertheless 
mutually dependent: no agency, no structure or institution; and no structure or institution, no 
agency. This meaning of dependence should be borne in mind later, when I refer to social 
structures and institutions existing independently of agents.  
 
e) The rejection of methodological and ontological individualism. Social structures and institutions 
are irreducible, in an ontological and/or an explanatory sense, to individuals, to the subjectivity 
of individuals, and to inter-subjectivity. This is a rejection of what Archer (1995: 84 passim) 
calls „upwards conflation‟.   
 
f) The rejection of methodological and ontological collectivism. Individual actions are irreducible, 
in an ontological and explanatory sense, to social structures. This erroneous doctrine results 
precisely from reducing individual actions and intentions to social structures. This is a rejection 
of what Archer (1995: 81, passim) calls „downwards conflation‟.   
 
g) The temporal priority of social structures and institutions over any one agent. Social structures 
and institutions pre-exist any particular episode of human action. Social structures and 
institutions can be changed, but the starting point is not of our choosing. This is a rejection of 
what Archer (1995: 87, passim) calls „downwards conflation‟.   
 
h) The foregoing points, encapsulated in Bhaskar‟s TMSA and Archer‟s Morphogentic  approach, 
constitute an updated, and more sophisticated version not only of Giddens‟s Structuration 
theory, but of the „agency-structure‟ framework more generally – although it is more accurate, if 
more cumbersome, to refer to the „agency-structure/institution‟ framework. The basis of these 
two critical realist approaches is this: in order to undertake (even the most insignificant) social 
action, agents have no choice but to (consciously and/or unconsciously) engage with the social 
structures and institutions that pre-exist them. To hold a conversation, agents have to engage 
with the institutional rules of grammar, and the convention of how far to stand from the 
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interlocutor. To enter paid employment, and thereby sell their labour power to those who own 
capital, agents have to engage with the social structure of class. By engaging with these 
institutions and structures, agents reproduce or transform these structures and/or institutions 
and, are themselves reproduced or transformed in the process. Social structures and 
institutions are the conditions of human action, they make human action possible; but they are 
not outcomes or actions and so cannot be patterns of actions. To put matter bluntly, there is 
more going on here than agents interacting (intersubjectively) with other agents; agents can 
only interact with other agents because they can interact with non-agential phenomena.  
  
i) Everything that has been said above for social structures and institutions, holds also for rules 
conventions, norms, values, customs, but not for laws, regulations practices, routines and 
precedents, or roles and I want to eliminate the patter group from the analysis in three steps. 
First, I eliminate practices, routines and precedents on the grounds that they are not conditions 
of action; they are actions. They are probably what we have in mind when we say things like: 
„John routinely treats his female employees as if they were idiots‟; „the practice around here is 
to buy cakes on your birthday‟ or „Sue set the precedent of leaving early on Friday‟. Second, I 
eliminate roles on the grounds that they are properties of organisations, not institutions. Agents 
are obliged to undertake a particular set of practices when they take up positions within an 
organisation. Finally, I eliminate laws and regulations on the grounds that, whilst they are a 
kind of rules they are: (a) explicitly and consciously specified and identified; (b) often backed 
by formal sanctions; and (c), in virtue of (a) and (b) are, once again, properties of 
organisations, not institutions. By a process of elimination, then, I am left with rules, 
conventions, norms, values5, customs, and these will form the basis of my analysis of 
institutions. Whilst it might be possible to identify distinctions between these terms, I will not do 
so in this paper.6 Henceforth, and where appropriate, I will often place the terms „rules‟, 
„conventions‟, „norms‟, „values‟ and  „customs‟ in brackets after the term „institution‟.  
 
j) Ontic similarity between social structures and institutions. What makes social structures and 
institutions (and for reasons that will become clear below, rules conventions, norms, values, 
customs), similar, is that they are drawn upon, reproduced and transformed, by human agents.  
 
k) It should be noted that many of the above points would be rejected by those for whom the very 
idea of structures and institutions (and rules conventions, norms, values, customs) existing 
independently (in the sense set out above) of the ideas, discourses, or actions of agents is a 
mistake.  I cannot engage with these arguments, so a few brief words must suffice. I have in 
mind here (those) postmodernists and poststructuralists who reduce social structure to ideas, 
language or discourse – e.g. Jackson and Carter (2000: 41 & 43). I also have in mind Harré‟s 
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social constructivist notion of social structures – e.g. see the symposium involving: May & 
Williams (2002) Harré (2002); Strydon (2002); and Carter (2002). I also have in mind those 
who, on some definition, can be considered ontological individualists such as King (2000; 
2005) and Turner (2007). The ontology I subscribe to does not, however, mean a total rejection 
all of the arguments these various writers raise.  
 
Now that we know how social structures and institutions (rules conventions, norms, values and 
customs) are similar, we need to consider how they differ. Let us start with institutions. 
 
2. Institutions 
There are several notable „Institutionalists‟ whose work spans the social sciences. One of the clearest, 
and one who has taken the trouble to clarify and define institutions (as opposed to using them in their 
work) is Hodgson, for whom: „Institutions are systems of established and embedded social rules that 
structure social interactions‟ (Hodgson 2006a: 18). My initial definition, then, is that institutions are: 
systems of established rules; put another way, institutions consist of, or are constituted by, rules. I will 
augment this below. 
 
Now, the analysis of rules has a long tradition, although our current understanding, at least in sociology,  
has come to us predominantly via Winch and Wittgenstein. On this understanding, however, rules are 
little more than intersubjectively held meanings about appropriate ways of behaving: they do not exist as 
phenomena external to the agent. By contrast, the conception of rules I operate with is a more realist 
version, wherein rules „have determinate content of their own, outside of the agreement of actors‟ 
(Kemp 2003: 63). Rules, just like social structures and institutions, are irreducible to the meanings or 
actions of agents; indeed, rules satisfy points (a) to (i) mentioned above.  
 
Hodgson (2006: 18) describes rules as: „socially transmitted and customary normative injunctions or 
immanently normative dispositions, that in circumstances X do Y‟. This is an unfortunate turn of phrase 
because, despite his best efforts to repudiate this interpretation, it encourages the (mis)interpretation 
that rules are rational decision rules, rather like rules economists (and game theorists) invent for homo 
economicus to follow; and follow to the letter. The rules Hodgson has in mind, however, are not of this 
ilk. Indeed, they ought to be thought of as „rules of thumb‟ that guide, but do not determine, action. 
Students and lecturers, for example, know that in lectures, there is a tacit, unwritten, rule that 
(effectively) states: „when in the lecture theatre, do not interrupt the lecturer unless invited‟. Because this 
rule is adhered to, by most students, most of the time, the lecture can „go on‟. Yet as is well known, not 
all students observe this rule. Rules can be broken, and they guide to varying degrees, but this is often 
sufficient for them to work (MacCormick 1998).  
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The fact that rules have been, and continue to be, used by some in a rationalistic manner, has led 
others to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Something like this has, arguably, led Bourdieu (e.g. 
1998, 10-30, 72 and passim), and his followers (e.g. Noble & Watkins 2003 and 522; Lizardo 2007: 344) 
to reject the very idea of rules as a basis for action. Whilst these writers correctly reject a rationalistic 
concept of rules, the use of rules as „rules of thumb‟ is not only perfectly compatible with Bourdieu‟s 
notion of habitus, something like it is absolutely necessary for the process of habituation. But more of 
this later.  
 
I noted above (point i) that everything I said about social structures and institutions, holds also for rules, 
conventions, norms, values and customs. Whilst there have been various attempts to define (some of) 
these terms, and a few attempts to identify differences between them, most famously by Weber (1968, 
especially chapter 1), Parsons (1951), and less famously, Tuomela (1995, especially chapter 1), 
Hodgson (1988; 2006a & b) and MacCormick (1998), there is a sense in which differences tend to 
disappear when these terms are actually put to use. Many writers use rules, conventions, norms, 
values, customs interchangeably.7 Recognition that (a) rules are similar to conventions, norms, values 
and customs, and (b) institutions consist of rules, allows me to augment my initial definition thus: 
institutions are systems of established rules, conventions, norms, values and customs; institutions 
consist of, or are constituted by, established rules, conventions, norms, values and customs.  
 
What, then, is the link between institutions and human action? The short answer is this: external 
institutions (rules, conventions, norms, values and customs) become internalised or embodied within 
agents as habits via a process of habituation, whereupon the habits dispose agents to think and act in 
certain ways, without having to deliberate. The long answer is to explain this more fully, and involves 
habit, habitus and habituation, which we now deal with in turn.  
 
Habit and  habitus 
According to Camic (1986: 1044) „the term “habit” generally denominates a more or less self acting 
disposition or tendency to engage in a previously adopted or acquired form of action‟. Furthermore, 
Camic (ibid: 1046) and Burkett (2002: 225) suggest that the term „habit‟ has become associated with a 
rather mechanistic, deterministic and unchanging response to stimuli. To avoid this interpretation Marcel 
Mauss substituted the term „habit‟ with the Latin term „habitus‟. Because I am not convinced that simply 
substituting habitus for habit  makes matters clearer, I will continue to use them interchangeably, using 
whichever of the terms is more appropriate in context. Whilst Bourdieu‟s works are littered with various 
definitions of habitus, the following seems the least ambiguous: 
 
Habitus, understood as a system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating 
past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, apperceptions, 
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and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to 
analogical transfers of schemes permitting the solution of similarly shaped problems 
(Bourdieu 1998: 82). 
 
Whilst I cannot go into great detail on habitus, it is probably wise to state the following key points. First, 
habitus is not an observable behaviour, pattern, routine or action (in the sense noted in part one) but a 
disposition, capacity or power that generates a tendency. Kleptomaniacs, for example, might possess 
the habit of stealing, but this does not mean they steal all the time: sometimes they do and sometimes 
they do not, and there may be no pattern to their behaviour.  Habitus is, however, always present in the 
form of a disposition generating a tendency to steal. A habitus, then, is an agential disposition that 
generates a tendency for the agent to do x – on tendencies see Fleetwood (2001) and (2008).  
 
Second, habitus is a largely unconscious disposition to engage in an action. The „feel for the game‟ is 
something that allows us to play „the game‟ (a metaphor encapsulating living and acting in society) 
without stopping to deliberate about every move – although it might be possible to do this in some 
circumstances by stopping to reflect upon our actions (Noble & Watkins 2003).  
 
Third, despite the fears of many, habitus is not (necessarily) a mechanistic, deterministic and 
unchanging conception implying determinism. Indeed, once habitus is understood as a tendency in the 
manner noted above, then many of these fears disappear.8  
 
Fourth habitus governs the physiological or biological aspects of actions like holding a cup and playing 
golf, and the social-psychological aspects of actions like holding the cup with an extended „pinkie‟ and 
deferring to the golf club captain – in certain social environments. Habitus, then, is psychophysical 
concept; it is „in‟ the mind / brain (embrained) and in the body (embodied).  
 
Fifth, it is often implied, if perhaps not intended, that habitus is something external to human agency, 
often via terminology like „institutional habitus‟, „family habitus‟, „class habitus‟, „gender habitus‟ and so 
on.  
 
Sixth, and in contrast to the last point, many writers conflate agency and structure/institution, as in the 
following example:  
 
Any conception of institutional habitus would similarly, constitute a complex amalgam of 
agency and structure and could be understood as the impact of a cultural group or social 
class on an individual's behaviour as it is mediated through an organisation. Institutional 
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habituses, no less than individual habituses, have a history and have been established 
over time (Reay, David & Ball, 2001: para 1.3). 
 
Seventh, habitus is not (somehow) in two places at once. It is not internal and external; not a property of 
agency and structure; not a property of the human mind / body and the social world; and nor is it a 
property of the social system, which is reflected in „personalized habiti‟ as Pickel (2005: 441) puts it. In a 
well argued paper on „masculine habitus‟, Connolloy (2006: 143-4) reminds us of the way physical 
objects and events facilitate thinking. Indeed, his comments recall the ways in which, for example, 
people have been shown to be faster at judging the sensibility of a sentence like „close the drawer‟ 
when it is accompanied by a hand movement pretending to close the drawer (Ignatow 2007: 122). 
Connolloy then asks: „where does this habitus lie?‟ Unfortunately, his (potentially anti-realist) answer not 
only denies a distinction between the external world and the mind / brain, but also slides into ambiguity 
writing: „the psychological tools with which an individual thinks and acts are not just internalised and 
contained within the mind, but are also crucially made up on the social environments and settings within 
which the individual is located‟ (emphasis added). This could mean (i) that the concepts with which we 
think and act (possibly meaning habitus) are internalised and contained within the mind whilst also 
existing outside the mind, contained in the social environments and settings; or (ii) that these concepts 
(habitus) are made up on wider social environments. It seems to me that (i) is implausible and perhaps 
nonsensical - at least when put this way. Assuming the ambiguous phrase „made up on‟ means 
something like „influenced or shaped by‟, then (ii) is plausible. But there is nothing in this that means a 
„distinction between the external world and the mind is untenable‟ (ibid). References to embodying or 
internalising social structures and institutions does not necessarily mean that these things „disappear 
into the body‟ or become „literally part of us‟; it does not „represent the ontological penetration of the 
individual‟ by these external phenomena as Elder-Vass puts it (2007c: 334). This is an important, if often 
misunderstood point, and the following analogy illustrates it beautifully: „This is the same species of 
error as the claim that a child leaving the zoo has animals in their head, rather than thoughts or beliefs 
about the animals they have seen‟ (ibid).  
 
Let me be clear. Institutions (and social structures) are always and everywhere external to human 
agents. Habitus is always and everywhere internal to human agents. In appropriate circumstances, 
habitus emerges within the nervous system of our mind / brains and bodies. The institutions (rules, 
conventions, norms, values and customs) remain precisely where they were, namely, external to us, 
and another phenomena, habitus, emerges, internal to us. 
 
Habituation 
Building upon Hodgson (2006a: 18), I define habituation as the process through which institutions 
(rules, conventions, norms, values and customs) become internalized and embodied within agents, 
 10 
generating the dispositions we call habits or habitus. It seems to me that the process of habituation 
involves the following three (main) processes: 
 
(i) Repetition, regularity, routinization and continuity. The (let us say) rule-guided agent finds 
herself repeating the same action over some extended period. As Hodgson (1988: 127) 
puts it: „repeated acts tend to congeal into habits‟.  
 
(ii) Reinforcement, or incentive and disincentive. There are positive and negative 
reinforcements to engaging in rule-guided action, such as approval or disapproval by 
members of the appropriate community – although this should not be interpreted to mean 
that agents necessarily deliberate about whether or not to be guided by the rule. See 
Hodgson (2003). 
 
(iii) Intimacy, familiarity or close proximity. To internalise or embody institutions (rules 
conventions, norms, values and customs) the agent has to engage with them, live with 
them and use them, until agents feel „like a fish in water‟, as it is commonly put.  
 
It is via these three (main) process of habituation that institutions and agents are linked. Metaphorically 
speaking, through these processes, institutions (rules, conventions, norms, values and customs) „touch‟ 
agents. This is very often recognised, even if implicitly – as the following example shows. In an article 
investigating the way a „masculine habitus‟ is internalised within young boys in UK schools, Connolly 
(2006: 144) writes of the „importance of wider social relations and structures‟. He then goes on to cash 
out these wider social relations and structures in terms of „the local housing estate, the boy‟s immediate 
family, their peer group, the school, the classroom‟. In his empirical findings, Connolloy goes into detail 
on what, in my terminology, would be the rules, conventions, norms, values and customs drawn upon by 
teachers when dealing with pupils of different ethnic backgrounds and gender. Moreover, it is not just 
teachers that are so guided. Black boys, for example, are guided by the rule, convention, norm, value or 
custom that: „Asian boys cannot run fast‟ (ibid: 150).9  
 
It is worth noting that habituation does not necessarily require one agent (or agents) to instruct another 
agent (or agents) on which rules conventions, norms, value or customs are appropriate in which 
context, or how to be guided by them. The degree of consciousness involved in the process of 
habituation is an empirical matter, but for the purposes of this paper, it is does not change matters.  
 
Reconstitutive downward causation 
Hodgson has recently identified one vitally important property of institutions, and I would extend this to 
rules, conventions, norms, values and customs: they have the capacity for reconstitutive downward 
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causation. Whilst there may be something of a consensus (at least between those that accept points a 
to i in section one) on the claim that social structures enable and constrain agents‟ intentions and 
actions, it is also believed, although less commonly, that social structures cannot directly affect agents‟ 
intentions and actions. Institutions and social structures are different because only the former can cause 
reconstitutive downward causation.  
 
This important difference between social structures and institutions gets lost, or at least is confused, in 
the writing of Bourdieu and his followers, because it is extremely common to read of structures 
generating the habitus. Metaphorically speaking, social structures are not „magical forces‟ that penetrate 
agents‟ minds and bodies, throwing a kind of mental switch and causing them to change their intentions. 
And yet institutions (rules, conventions, norms, values and customs) do have something like this ability 
– although I do not want to push this metaphor any further. What prevents this explanation from being 
„magical‟ is the fact that the process of habituation explains how institutions effect agents‟ intentions and 
actions. The following comments from Hodgson incorporate the points made thus far, and then extend 
them to the idea of reconstitutive downward causation: 
 
What have to be examined are the social and psychological mechanisms leading to such 
changes of preference, disposition, or mentality. What does happen, is the framing, 
shifting and constraining capacities of social institutions give rise to new perceptions and 
dispositions within individuals. Upon new habits of thought and behaviour, new 
preferences and intentions emerge…[R]econstitutive downward causation works by 
creating and moulding habits (Hodgson 2002: 170-1). 
 
The following example explains how reconstitutive downward causation works. 
 
For reason of cost, and a desire to minimise pollution and road congestion, a person may 
use the bus to travel to work. As a result of this repeated behaviour, an associated set of 
habits of thought and behaviour will be reinforced. These habits may have further 
repercussions. However, if the bus service is withdrawn, then the individual will be obliged 
to use another means of travel. It may be that there is no alternative to the car. The 
individual will then begin to drive to work and develop another set of habits. Even if a 
preference for public transport is maintained, it could eventually be undermined by 
repeated personal car use. The change in the provision of public transport can alter 
preferences for that mode (2003: 166).  
 
How exactly does repeated car use cause a new set of habits of thought and behaviour, leading to a 
preference for car use? Hodgson‟s example does not elaborate, but it is not difficult to imagine what he 
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has in mind. Consider the daily routine of finding the car keys, walking to the car, getting started, driving 
the familiar route to work, (in relative warmth, dryness, comfort and convenience vis-à-vis bus travellers) 
parking, then doing the same every evening. When this goes on every day of every week of every 
month of every year, it becomes ritual, a habit. Through repeated behaviour of this kind, the commuter 
may well eventually develop a preference for car use. As Veblen wrote in 1908: „habits of thought are 
the outcomes of habits of life‟ (Hodgson 2004: 171). Habits, then, are not (always) internalised or 
embodied consciously or actively, but sub-consciously and passively. Even if agents were initially 
conscious of some aspect of behaviour, perhaps via instruction, through repetition, and over time, it 
often retreats into our sub-conscious. Habits are multiple, and on occasion, can lead to contradictory 
intentions and actions. To have a habit is to have a tacit skill, a „feel for the game‟. As Hodgson (2003: 
164) puts it: „Through their habits, individuals carry the marks of their own unique history‟. This is 
virtually identical to Bourdieu for whom: „habitus is history turned into nature (1998: 78). Habits or 
habitus emerge via this process of habituation, and intentions and actions can change, entirely without 
deliberation. This, of course, gives institutions causal properties. These causal properties are of a 
different kind than the causal properties possessed by human agents, but they are causal in the sense 
that they alter the intentions and actions of agents, often without the agents being aware. See point k in 
section one.  
 
Whether Hodgson and Bourdieu accept the following point, it is likely that intentions and actions are 
sometimes caused by habit alone, sometimes by deliberation alone, and sometimes by a combination of 
habit and deliberation in a complex iterative process. Elder-Vass makes the point with his usual 
succinctness:  
 
[I]t might be possible that our actions are directly and non-consciously determined by our 
current dispositions, while allowing that those dispositions are themselves the outcome of 
a series of past events. Those events include (i) very recent reflections that we tend to 
see as directly causally effective „decisions‟; (ii) older reflections that shaped our 
dispositions consciously at the time but which we may now have forgotten; and (iii) 
experiences that affected our dispositions (for example in the subliminal acquisition of a 
habit or skill) without us ever consciously deciding how‟ (Elder-Vass 2006: 175). 
 
Habituation and neuroscience 
Several articles have appeared recently (many in the Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour) 
explaining the neuroscientific underpinnings of habitus – e.g. Burkitt (2002), Pickel (2005), Ignatow 
(2007), Lizardo (2004 & 2007) and Elder-Vass (2007c) not to mention their critics such as King (2000 & 
2005) and Turner (2007). Many of these articles draw upon the work of Gallese (2000, 2001, 2003) 
Gallese & Metzinger (2003), and Gallese & Lakoff (2005), especially work on „mirror neurons‟ and the 
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„shared manifold hypothesis‟. I will refer to this body of work as Galesse et al. Let me try and sketch the 
basic idea. For a succinct, constructive, critical elaboration of Galesse et al see Borg (2007). 
 
Mirror neurons are specific neurons that discharge: (i) when I observe another individual executing a 
motor action X (e.g. grasping a cup); (ii) when I execute action X; and (iii) when I imagine activating 
action X in the absence of the other individual. Imagining is a form of pretence reasoning, a kind of „off-
line‟ version of executing action X – if it were „on-line‟ my imagining action X would cause me to execute 
action X. This gives me a kind of tacit and practical knowledge about actions of type X, and I am able to 
use this to understand and predict the actions of others. I can, for example, predict (at least with a 
degree of accuracy) that the person who grasps the cup, will subsequently drink from it. Gallese et al, 
go on to make two additional, and radical, developments. First, they claim that the system of mirror 
neurons allows me to understand the intention underlying another individual‟s execution of action X, that 
is, to know their reasons for doing it. Second, they claim that what goes for motor actions like grasping a 
cup, also goes for things like feelings and emotions. Drawing, largely, upon Phenomenology, and the 
notion of empathy (a portmanteau term to refer to a wide range of expressive behaviour) Gallese et al, 
suggest that feelings and emotions displayed by others can be „empathized‟, and thereby understood. 
The same system of mirror neurons that is at work for motor actions is also at work when we empathize 
with others. The following comment extends these points: 
 
When we enter into a relation with others there is a multiplicity of states that we share 
with them. We share our bodily schema, our being subject to pain as well as to other 
somatic sensations. At this point we need a conceptual tool to capture the richness of the 
experiences we share with others. I will introduce this conceptual tool as the shared 
manifold of intersubjectivity. I posit that it is by means of this shared manifold that we 
recognize other human beings as similar to us. It is just because of this shared manifold 
that intersubjective communication and mind-reading become possible. The shared 
manifold can be operationalised at three different levels… 
 The phenomenological level is the one responsible for the sense of similarity, of 
being individuals within a larger social community of persons like us, that we 
experience anytime we confront ourselves with other human beings…Actions, 
emotions and sensations experienced by others become meaningful to us because 
we can share them with them.   
 
 The functional level can be characterized in terms of simulation routines, as if 
processes enabling models of others to be created. 
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 The subpersonal level is instantiated as the result of the activity of a series of mirror 
matching neural circuits (Gallese & Lakoff 2001: 44-5). 
 
How successful is this neuroscience as an explanation of the underpinnings of habitus? The answer, 
unfortunately, is: not very. Despite references to social structures, institutions and occasionally things 
like rules (e.g. Gallese 2001: 33), the analysis shifts away from phenomena such as these that are 
external to human agents, away from an agency-structure/institution framework, to intersubjectivity and 
an agency-agency framework. This neuroscience does, however, offer two lessons, albeit with a little 
finessing.  
 
First, although Gallesse et al’s neuroscience might be sound, confusion appears to creep in at what 
they call the phenomenological level.10 Let me re-describe the phenomenological level, but this time 
inserting a reference to rules.  
 
 The phenomenological level is the one responsible for the sense of similarity, of being 
individuals acting within a social environment consisting of rules that are external to us, and 
that influence our intentions and actions. These rules experienced by others, become 
meaningful to us because we can share them with them.  
 
The habitus emerges at the functional level and is explained via the subpersonal level as the result of 
the activity of a series of mirror matching neural circuits. The mirror neuron system might explain, not 
individuals simply observing other individuals, but individuals observing other individuals being guided 
by rules. Indeed, invoking their wide notion of empathy, we might be able to see this as a process that 
allows individuals to know that the reason for a person doing X, is that they are being guided by some 
rule – where „knowing‟ the rule means „knowing‟ the rule tacitly, or knowing how to follow the rule. The 
manifold we share, then, is not just one of intersubjectivity. The reason we are able to enter into a 
relation with others, is not just because we share a multiplicity of states that we share with them  (e.g. 
bodily schema, being subject to pain, other somatic sensations) but also because we share a set of 
rules with them. The shared manifold is also a shared manifold of instututions, rules, conventions, 
norms, values and customs.  
 
Second, unless the action in question has a very significant impact upon me (say by burning me), then 
the process of mirror neurons discharging seems to be involved in the three (main) processes of 
habituation noted above - a „constant encounter and interaction with the world via our bodies and brains‟ 
as Gallese (2005: 456) puts it.  
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In sum, then, institutions: (a) consist of systems of established rules, conventions, norms, values and 
customs; (b) are sometimes consciously, at least at first, but more often unconsciously, internalised or 
embodied as habits or habitus, via a process of habituation, itself rooted in, but irreducible to, the 
nervous system; (c) assist in making the intentions and actions of other agents relatively predictable; (d) 
exist independently of the agents who draw upon, reproduce or transform them, and in so-doing, 
reproduce or transform themselves; and (e) may, via a process of reconstitutive downward causation 
involving habituation, habitus and habit, transform the intentions and actions of these agents. The 
foregoing arguments suggest that:  
 
An institution is a system of established rules, conventions, norms, values and customs that 
become embodied or internalized within agents as habits or habitus, via a process of 
habituation rooted in the nervous system, to assist in rendering (relatively) predictable, the 
intentions and actions of agents who draw upon, reproduce or transform these phenomena, 
whilst simultaneously reproducing and transforming themselves and who may, via a process of 
reconstitutive downward causation, have their intentions and actions transformed.  
 
3. Social structures 
Lopez and Scott (2000) identify three broad approaches to social structures which they refer to as 
institutional, embodied and relational structures. Of these three approaches, I will argue that only the 
latter are bone fide social structures; the former are both very similar, if not identical to, what many 
would just call institutions. Let me go through these broad approaches in turn. 
 
Institutional Structure  
Lopez & Scott define institutional structure as: 
 
those cultural or normative patterns that define the expectations that agents hold about 
each other‟s behaviour and that organize their enduring relations with each other (Lopez 
& Scott 2000: 3).  
 
In attempting to explain why institutional structure is a social structure, in many places they abandon the 
term „institutional structure‟ and simply refer to „social institutions‟ (circa 24 passim). Although they do 
not make much use of the term „rule‟ it seems clear that they have it in mind. It is presupposed in 
examples they use such as queuing, turn-taking in conversations and collective bargaining. 
Furthermore, they argue that institutions are built from norms, and norms are „rules of conduct,‟ (ibid: 
25). They also refer to rules in the work of ethnomethodologists such as Cicourel (ibid: 94). 
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The following points, however, show where Lopez & Scott‟s understanding of institutional structure 
differs from the understanding of institution I am trying to sustain. First, institutions are not patterns as 
they often hint at (ibid: 25). Second, Lopez & Scott do not mention reconstitutive downward causation, 
nor seem aware of the fact that agents‟ intentions and actions might be changed by institutions. Third, 
for them, the key mechanisms through which institutions operate are not habits and the process of 
habituation, but „the concept of social positions and role expectations‟ (ibid: 29).  
 
Social institutions regulate actions by defining social positions agents can occupy and the 
behaviour that is associated with these positions… As a part of culture, knowledge about 
social positions is held in the individual mind, but this knowledge is shared by those who 
interact together (ibid: 29). 
 
Each social position defines a role in social life for its occupants…Roles are definitions of 
those things that people are expected to do…They are blueprints or templates for 
action…They specify the rights and obligations that are entailed in social positions, and 
tell us what is expected of us and what we should expect others to do (ibid: 30). 
 
For them, institutions are built from norms, norms are synonymous with rules, and norms or rules 
generate regular behaviour. Institutions regulate behaviour by defining social positions, and associated 
roles. Roles now appear to be doing what norms previously did, and because, norms and rules are 
synonymous, then roles now appear to be doing what rules did. If I interpret them correctly, their 
understanding of social positions and role expectations fits with the Institutionalist understanding of 
habits and the process of habituation.  
 
Alongside norms and rules, there are social positions and roles. An agent, who takes up a position, 
inherits a set of practices. For example, a person who takes up the role of lecturer, inherits a set of 
practices (e.g. teaching, research and administration) and a set of rules involved with these practices. 
Some rules are explicit, such as those contained in the employment contract; and some are implicit, 
such as those regulating how „late‟ is „late‟ in terms of a student who hands in a „late‟ essay. Whether 
explicit or implicit, conscious or unconscious, many of these rules, via a process of habituation, become 
embodied in the form of habits. When the lecturer becomes experienced, these habits become a social 
skill that, for example, avoids the need to stop and weigh up the pros and cons of each „late‟ essay. The 
lecturer employs the „it is only a day late‟ rule. If this interpretation is plausible, then there seems a place 
for social positions and roles, or positioned-practices, alongside the processes of habit and habituation.  
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Institutions, then, consist of rules and norms that allow those agents who draw upon them to co-ordinate 
their actions with others who do likewise. In this case, however, institutional structures become very 
similar, if not identical, to what many would just call institutions.  
 
Embodied structure 
Lopez & Scott (2000: 4) define embodied structure as: „the habits and skills that are inscribed in human 
bodies and minds‟. They then draw upon Bourdieu‟s notion of habitus in an attempt to show how social 
structures are „inscribed‟ or in my terminology, internalised or embodied. They suggest that the „class 
habitus‟:  
 
is the result of the particular experiences and opportunities shared by those who occupy a 
particular class position. It is because people acquire a class-specific habitus that there 
are similar patterns of class action in various fields of activity; and it is because of these 
similar objective patterns that they acquire the habitus. Politics, leisure, religion, art, and 
so on all show similar patterns of class behaviours when they are the results of (and 
therefore the conditions for) the application of class habituses…Individuals acquire these 
systems of classification and social behaviour without realizing that they are doing so  
(ibid: 104-5). 
 
Whilst I have no problem with the general idea that „individuals acquire these systems of classification 
and social behaviour without realizing that they are doing so‟, what is needed is an explanation of the 
processes by which this occurs. Here we come to the nub of the distinction between social structures 
and institutions. We can provide such an explanation for institutions, but not social structures. 
Institutions (rules, conventions, norms, values and customs) are, and remain, external to agents, 
causing habitus to emerge via a process of habituation. There is, however, no similar process by which 
social structures can be internalised or embodied. The way out of this dilemma is to abandon the 
misleading term „class habitus‟ and recognise that agents are not engaging with social structures (or 
institutional structures), at least not directly. Instead, agents are engaging directly with institutions (rules, 
conventions, norms, values and customs). I will elaborate upon this below, after discussing relational 
structures.  
 
We started this section with a definition stating that embodied structure consists of the habits and skills 
that are internalised or embodied in human bodies and minds. But to explain internalisation or 
embodiment, we had to use the processes of habituation through which habitus is formed. And this 
makes embodied structures very similar, if not identical, to what many would just call institutions.  
 
Relational Structure 
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Lopez & Scott define relational structure as:  
 
the social relations themselves, understood as patterns of causal interconnection and 
interdependence among agents and their actions, as well as the positions that they 
occupy (Lopez & Scott 2000: 3).  
 
In contrast to the last two broad approaches, relational structures are, I will argue, bone fide social 
structures. Before getting down to this, however, we need to deal with a division in the concept of 
relational structure. Elder-Vass, who has recently written cogently on social structures, observes that 
relational structure:  
 
can refer to the whole entity that is structured by the relations between its parts, which I 
shall call structure-as-whole, or it can refer to the way that a group of things (generally the 
parts of a whole) is related to each other, which I shall call structure-as-relations. (Elder-
Vass 2006: 100. See also Elder-Vass 2007b & c). 
 
Whilst he hesitates to say that the term „social structure‟ should be restricted to structure-as-whole 
„because of the confusion this would cause when dealing with…normative institutions‟ (2007b: 465) he 
does not rule this out. He defines an institution as „the causal power of a norm group…to tend to induce 
conformance with a normative standard‟ (ibid: 470), insisting that the relation between the individuals of 
the group that matters is their commitment to endorse the practices arising from the norm with each 
other. An institution, then, is not the norm group itself (i.e. a bunch of people), but the emergent property 
or power of the norm group. Whilst he does not define norms, they appear to be remarkably similar to 
rules, not to mention conventions, norms, values and customs (ibid: 472). See also Elder-Vass 2007c).  
 
Whilst Elder Vass is not entirely clear, and to be fair, his paper deals primarily with social structures and 
only tangentially with institutions, I interpret the differences between us as follows. His definition turns 
on norms; my definition turns not just on norms, but also rules, conventions, values and customs. He 
thinks an institution is the causal power to induce conformity.  I think an institution has the causal power 
to induce conformity. He thinks structure-as-whole is a kind of structure-as-relation because the 
fundamental principle at work is a relation which he thinks is a commitment to abide by the norm. I think 
structure-as-whole is not a kind of structure-as-relation because the fundamental principle at work in a 
structure-as-whole is a commitment to abide by a norm not a relation, and a commitment to abide by a 
norm is not a relation. This is quite tricky, so allow me to proceed cautiously. It is true that relations 
between individuals in a group are necessary for the group to be a group. It is also true that individuals 
in a norm group must commit to the norm if the group is to be a norm group as opposed to some other 
kind of group. But a relation is not the same thing as a commitment; a relation (might) cause 
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commitment; a relation typically, involves more than commitment – e.g. a social relation, typically, 
involves power, but we would not say the relation is power. This will become clear in a few moments 
when I explain why relations might be causally efficacious.  
 
Now, interesting as this debate is, it is rapidly becoming the subject of another paper. I call a halt to it, 
by asserting my prerogative (as author) to interpret what Elder-Vass takes to be a structure-as-whole, 
as an institution. I will say nothing more about structure-as-whole, and turn now to consider structure-
as-relations in more depth.  
 
For Elder-Vass, treating social structure as structure-as-relations means rejecting its causal efficacy 
because, he argues, relations themselves are not causally efficacious: only their relata are.  
 
[R]relations as such can have no causal effect on the world. It is only when actual entities 
are related that the set of entities so related can have an effect; and, as I have shown in 
chapter three, when we claim that a set of lower-level entities and the stable substantial 
relations between them have a causal effect, this is synonymous with claiming that there 
is a higher-level entity formed from these parts and relations that is the causally effective 
element. Ultimately, then, the idea that structures have causal effects is incoherent if 
structure is taken to mean structures-as-relations and not structures-as-wholes (Elder-
Vass 2006: 100, emphasis added) 
 
Two key phrases make Elder-Vass‟s argument compelling. First is his claim that: „relations as such can 
have no causal effect on the world. It is only when actual entities are related that the set of entities so 
related can have an effect‟. Second, is Ollman‟s worry that a focus solely on relations between things, 
without the things themselves, might lead to reification of the term „between‟ (cited in Elder-Vass 2006: 
56). I must admit, this threw me for a while until in a discussion, a colleague11 pointed out that there is 
no such thing as a „relation as such‟, or a relation without relata. There can be no „between‟ if there are 
no things „either side‟ as it were. Of course a „relation as such‟ has no causal efficacy, but this is 
because it is not real – although ambiguous phraseology might suggest or imply otherwise. Is there a 
sense in which relation-as-structure can be rescued by abandoning the misleading idea of a „relation as 
such‟ and allowing that relations are always relations between things? I think there is.  
 
The roots of a plausible notion of structure-as-relations lies in what Elder-Vass (2006: 55) previously 
attributed to Collier who writes that: „The latticework of relations constitutes the structure of “society”‟. 
For Elder-Vass, „the latticework of relations constitutes structure (i.e. the mode of organisation)‟. I 
assume this means that the relations constitute the mode of organisation or even „the way a group of 
things or people relate‟ (Elder-Vass 2006: 100). It might be less confusing to treat structure-as-relation 
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as a latticework of relations, with different latticework‟s referring to different ways in which the parts 
relate. We would then be able to differentiate between relational structures because we could 
differentiate between latticeworks. One latticework involving relations between employers and 
employees would constitute a class relation; a different latticework involving relations between men and 
women would constitute the structure of gender; and yet another latticework involving relations between 
white and black people would constitute the structure of race; and so on. Notice that we are dealing 
here with relations, not rules, conventions, norms, values and customs, and hence clearly, not with 
institutions. 
 
If the relations between a set of unchanging things are altered and new, systematic and stable relations 
emerge, then the entity will become a different one. The change will be caused solely by changes in the 
relations. We could identify a different latticework, a different way in which the parts relate. Imagine a 
scenario wherein an unemployed person contemplates offering her labour power on the labour market, 
and an employer contemplates hiring labour power. At the stage of contemplation, when the two parties 
are unaware of each other, are totally unrelated, each has causal powers X and Y respectively, and 
these powers exist independently of any relation between them. If the two parties come together and 
sign an employment contract, then at this point, a very definite relationship emerges: an employment 
relation which, in Marxist terms, is simultaneously a class relation.  
  
Notice that the employment relation is a very definite or particular one. The employee and employer 
may be related in terms of being family, friends, or supporting the same football club, but these relations 
are not the same as the employment relation, they constitute a different latticework. If the way the 
people relate should change, that is, if the relations should change, people would act differently. If, for 
example, the employer married the employee and the latter ceased work, then the employment relation 
would disappear and a different relation, a family relation, would emerge. The relations that we are 
focussing upon in this example, those that constitute the employment relation, are not external, but 
internal relations – i.e. where the nature of one of the relata, depends upon the nature of the other: 
landlord and tenant would be another example.  
 
Now, has the relation (between things) caused anything? The employee, who previously had causal 
powers X, now has additional causal power X1 - e.g. the power to purchase goods with wages. The 
employer, who previously had causal powers Y, now has additional causal power Y1 - e.g. the power to 
produce extra products with the additional labour. What is the cause of these additional causal powers? 
There are (at least) three possibilities: 
 
a) The cause of the additional powers could be the employment relation, the way the people 
are organised or related.  
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b) The cause of the additional powers could be something involved in creating the 
relationship, like the employment contract or the workplace.  
c) The cause of the additional powers could be something to do with the act of transferring 
resources. The employer transfers wages (which was part of Y) to the employee and the 
employee transfers the control of labour power to the employer (which was part of X).  
 
Cause (b) seems to depend upon cause (a) in the sense that the employment contract depends upon 
the employment relation, indeed, the contract officially registers the existence of the relation. No 
employment relation, no employment contract. Cause (c) also seems to depend on cause (a). The 
resources without the transfer, and hence without the relation, remain in their original locations and 
cannot become additional causal powers. No employment relation, no transfer, no resources.  By 
default we are left with cause (a) and may conclude that employment relations, as an example of 
(social) relations more generally, are causally efficacious. 
  
In sum, then, having abandoned the misleading idea of a „relation as such‟ and recognised that relations 
are always relations between things, I conclude that: (social) relations are causal; (social) relations are 
emergent entities; structure-as-relation is plausible and so, therefore, is relational structure. Unlike 
institutional structures, embodied structures and also structure-as-whole, which are all more accurately 
interpreted as institutions, relational structure, qua structure-as-relation, is a bone fide social structure. 
The foregoing arguments suggest that:   
 
A social structure is a latticework of internal relations between entities that may enable and 
constrain (but cannot transform) the intentions and actions of agents who draw upon, 
reproduce and/or transform these relations.12   
 
Conclusion 
Recognition that institutional and embodied structures are better understood as institutions, and that a 
social structure is a latticework of internal relations, helps to explain why there is no process, like 
habituation, by which social structures can be internalised or embodied. Understanding this requires an 
understanding of the differential ways in which agents engage with, or are linked to, social structures 
and institutions. I have elaborated upon this elsewhere (Fleetwood 2008) so will be relatively brief here. 
 
Consider agency and institutions, and bear two points in mind. First, agents engage with institutions via 
three (main) habituation processes: (i) repetition, regularity, routinization and continuity; (ii) 
reinforcement, or incentive and disincentive and (iii) intimacy, familiarity or close proximity. Via these 
processes, metaphorically speaking, institutions „touch‟ agents. Recall the example of Connolloy who 
details what are, in effect, the rules, conventions, norms, values and customs drawn upon by teachers 
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and pupils. Second, the habituation process is largely unconscious, which does not preclude the 
possibility that things can be learned consciously, and then these things slip to „the back of the mind‟ as 
it were, such that forget whence they came – see the quotation from Elder-Vass on p12.13 This can be 
summed up by saying that habituation is the process that links institution and agency.  
 
Now consider agency and social structures, and bear two points in mind. First agents engage with 
social structures by entering into particular relations – relations of class or gender for example. 
Continuing with the metaphor, social structures do not „touch‟ agents – or at least not directly. There is 
nothing like the three (main) habituation processes going on here. Second, the engagement with social 
structures is conscious.14 Stated briefly, agents consciously take social structures into consideration 
when they reflexively deliberate upon some potential course of action. This reflexive deliberation occurs 
via the internal conversation whereby agents literally talk to themselves (and sometimes others) about 
their needs, concerns and the social structures that might constrain or enable them. They then 
formulate (fallible) courses of action, or agential projects, they think might result in their needs being met 
and their concerns addressed. This can be summed up by saying that reflexive deliberation, via the 
internal conversation is the process that links social structure and agency.  
 
Although agents engage with institutions via the (largely) unconscious process of habituation, and 
engage with social structures via reflexive deliberation and the internal conversation, this does not  
mean that social structures have no effect on habitus; any effect is likely to be indirect. When Bourdieu 
and followers suggest that the social structure of class, generates a particular habitus (they would say 
„class habitus‟), they have in mind something like the following – the diagram is borrowed from Harker 
and cited in Mouzelis (1995: 194). 
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Figure 1  
 
If I am right, however, this is a mistake. Instead, we should sketch this diagrammatically as follows: 
 
Figure 2  
 
 
It is likely that social structures „effect‟, „influence‟ or „shape‟ institutions (rules, conventions, norms, 
values and customs) which, in turn, cause the emergence of a habitus that, in some sense, „reflects‟ or 
„expresses‟ these social structures. Social structures have a causal role to play in generating the 
habitus, but only indirectly via institutions and, I might add, organisations. Elaboration upon exactly how 
social structures „influence‟ or „shape‟ institutions (and organisations); and how institutions (and 
organisations) „influence‟ or „shape‟ habitus is the subject for another paper. Yet having a clear 
understanding of the similarities and differences between institutions and social structures is a 
necessary precondition for such an elaboration.  
 
 
 
                                                 
Notes 
1 I thank three anonymous referees for their extremely helpful comments on previous drafts.   
2 I will not distinguish between social and cultural structures. On this see Archer (1995).  
3 Others share this concern. Battiera (2006); Hodgson (2002, 2003, 2004, 2006a & b); Jessop & Nielsen 
(2003); Lawson (2003); Nielsen (2006); Rogers-Hollingsworth (2002); Searle (2005) and Portes (2005) 
seek to tighten up our understanding of institutions. Archer (2000); Elder-Vass (2006, 2007a, 2007b); 
Jackson (2007); Lewis (2000); Lewis & Runde (2007); Lopez & Scott (2000); Lounsbury & Ventresca 
structures institutions practice habitus 
 
structures habitus practice 
 24 
                                                                                                                                            
(2003); Risman (2004); Porpora (1998, 2007) and Scott (2001) have done something similar for social 
structures. 
4 See Elder-Vass (2006 and 2007a) for an elaboration of emergence. 
5 Rule-guided behaviour may have an ethical element to it, because rules do not just guide, they often 
guide us to do the „right‟ thing - hence the inclusion of values. See Van Staveren (2001: chapter 7) and 
MacCormick  (1998). 
6 Should it transpire that a convention, norm, value or custom has is a property that means it should be 
not be associated with a rule, I will happily disassociate it. Until such time I proceed with this more 
inclusive definition. 
7 Burns & Carson (2002); Rogers Hollingsworth (2002); De Cindio, Gentile, Grew & Redolfi (2003); 
O‟Mahoney (2005); Lindbladh & Lyttkens (2002) are recent examples. 
8 See McLeod (2005) and Burkitt (2002) for refutations of habitus as a mechanistic and deterministic 
concept. 
9 Something like these three processes is going on, even if it is not explicitly mentioned, in the following 
articles - selected because they are relatively recent, and they deliberately use the concept of habitus:  
Colley (2003); David, Ball, Davies & Reay (2003); Holdsworth (2006); McDonough (2006); Nash (2003); 
O‟Mahony (2007); Taylor (2005). 
10 What I interpret as „confusion‟ might, of course, be clarity on their part and disagreement between 
them and myself. After all, they are coming, philosophically speaking, from a Phenomenological tradition 
that, at best is vague on the metaphysics of reality, and at worst anti-realist. Gallesse et al might simply 
reject my realist position on the existence of rules as real entities, irreducible to intersubjective 
agreement.  
11 I thank Filipe Sousa for this insight. 
12 This is in-keeping with Porpora (1998: 344) and (2007:198). 
13 The fact that we can reflect upon unconscious habits of others does not involve a performative 
contradiction as one referee suggested: it means we are consciously discussing the unconscious habits 
of others. 
14 Archer (2003) has an entire book dedicated to the relation between structure and agency, and her 
work has been elaborated upon by Elder-Vass (2007c) and Mutch 2004). 
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